Abstract-In this paper, we consider a new class of unconditionally secure authentication codes, called linear authentication codes (or linear A-codes). We show that a linear A-code can be characterized by a family of subspaces of a vector space over a finite field. We then derive an upper bound on the size of source space when other parameters of the system, that is, the sizes of the key space and the authenticator space, and the deception probability, are fixed. We give constructions that are asymptotically close to the bound and show applications of these codes in constructing distributed authentication systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
U NCONDITIONALLY secure authentication codes (Acodes) allow two trusting parties to communicate in the presence of an opponent who may construct a fraudulent message, and/or substitute a transmitted message with a fraudulent one.
The construction of unconditionally secure A-codes relies on a number of theoretical areas including design theory, finite geometry, coding theory, and information theory. Previous research on authentication theory has been mainly focused on deriving bounds on parameters of A-codes and construction of codes with desirable properties such as having the minimum possible deception probabilities and the minimum number of keys. In general, to describe the model of A-codes and characterize optimal codes, a combinatorial approach is used. For example, numerous results are in the form "an A-code with certain properties exists if and only if a certain combinatorial structure exists."
In this paper, we introduce a new class of A-codes, called linear A-codes. Linearity requires some additional algebraic properties for the A-codes; that is, we require both the key space and the authenticator space of the codes be vector spaces, and a source state to induce a linear mapping between them. The main motivation of linear A-codes stems from the study Manuscript received August 11, 2001 ; revised November 15, 2002 . The material in this paper was presented in part at Indocrypt 2001, The Second International Conference on Cryptology, Chennai, India, December [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 2001 .
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Communicated by P. of distributed authentication systems in which the functionality of authentication is to be distributed among a number of participants. The extra algebraic property allows more efficient constructions of such distributed systems. We characterize linear A-codes in terms of a family vector spaces over finite fields such that the dimension of the intersection of a pair of such subspaces does not exceed a certain desired value (security parameter). We derive an upper bound on the number of possible source states of an A-code for given deception probabilities and number of keys, and give constructions that meet, or asymptotically meet, the bound.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give definitions and review known results on A-codes that will be required for the rest of the paper. In Section III, we introduce linear A-codes. Characterization of A-codes in terms of the families of subspaces of a vector space is given in Section IV, and bounds on the number of source states and constructions that asymptotically meet the bounds are given in Sections V and VI. We show how linear A-codes can be used to construct distributed authentication schemes in Section VII. Finally, we propose further research problems and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. AUTHENTICATION CODES (A-CODES)
A-codes were first considered by Gilbert, MacWilliams, and Sloane [10] . Development of the general theory of unconditionally secure authentication systems has been initiated by Simmons [22] , [23] and extended by a number of authors (see, for example, [1] - [3] , [5] , [7] , [8] , [11] , [16] , [19] , [24] - [28] ).
In the conventional model for unconditionally secure authentication system, there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate a message to a receiver using a public channel which is subject to active attacks. That is, the opponent may impersonate the transmitter and insert a message into the channel, or replace a transmitted message with a fraudulent one. To protect against these attacks, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key which is used to choose an authentication rule from an A-code.
A systematic A-code (or A-code without secrecy) is a code in which a message that is sent through the channel, consists of a source state (i.e., plaintext) concatenated with an authenticator (or a tag). Such a code is a triple of finite sets together with an (authentication) function :
. We sometimes also denote the A-code by . Here is the set of source states, is the set of keys, and is the set of authenticators. When the transmitter wants to send the message using a key , which is secretly shared with the receiver, he transmits the message , where Suppose the opponent has the ability to insert messages into the channel and/or to modify existing messages. An impersonation attack is when the opponent inserts a new message into the channel. A substitution attack is when the opponent sees a message and changes it to where . A message is called valid if there exists a key such that . We assume that there is a probability distribution on the source states, which is known to all the participants. Given the probability distribution on the source states, the receiver and the transmitter will choose a probability distribution for . We will denote the probability of success of the opponent in impersonation and substitution attacks by and , respectively. Then we have valid and valid observed
In the remainder of the paper, we will always assume that the keys and the source states are uniformly distributed. In this case, we can represent and as follows:
Consider an A-code , where is a set of source states, and is a set of authenticators. For this code, it is known that and . Codes with have been known to be equivalent to orthogonal arrays (see [26] ). That is, suppose we have an A-code without secrecy with source states and having authenticators in which . Then and equality occurs if and only if there exists an orthogonal array , where . One of the goals of authentication theory is to derive bounds on various parameters of A-codes and to construct A-codes with desired properties. For a review of different bounds and constructions for A-codes, refer to [11] , , [14] , [24] , and [26] .
III. LINEAR A-CODES
Consider an A-code . For each key , the authentication function :
induces a mapping from to defined by , . Thus, the A-code can be characterized completely by the family of mappings , and vice versa. An attractive family of such mappings is obtained from an almost strongly universal hash family, which was introduced by Wegman and Carter [27] and has been the basis of the most combinatorial constructions. More details on the connections between almost strongly universal hash families and A-codes can be found in [2] , [26] , [27] .
A source state in an A-code can also be uniquely associated with a mapping from to defined by , . Then, again, the A-code can be characterized by a family of mapping . In a conventional authentication system, the key space and the authenticator space do not have any algebraic structures. We will consider A-codes in which and have some additional algebraic structures. In particular, and are vector spaces over a finite filed , and is a family of -linear mappings from to . These codes are called linear A-codes. As will be shown in Section VII, linear A-codes are useful in constructing distributed authentication schemes. On the other hand
The I-equitable property means that for any choice of and , has the least success chance for impersonation attack, and maximizes . Using Lemma 4.1, we will only consider I-equitable A-codes.
We
, since the A-code is I-equitable, we know that . It follows that there exists an isomorphism from to and is an -linear mapping from to and . Notice that . Otherwise, if is authenticated, the authenticated message can be substituted with that the receiver will always accept as authentic. This contradicts the assumption . Thus, we can simply replace by without changing the parameters of the A-code, and the procedure can be repeatedly carried out until each element in is an onto linear mapping from to . We then take to be .
Let denote the -dimensional linear space over . and We note that A-codes with these parameters were first constructed by Gilbert, MacWilliams, and Sloane [10] . Their construction uses projective planes and works as follows. Let be a prime power. Consider the projective plane over the fields . In the next section, we give a construction that meets the asymptotic bound in (1) .
It is also worth pointing out that while in the general theory of A-codes it is possible that the size of source states grows exponentially with the size of the key, for example, the construction based on universal hash family (see, for example, [27] , [2] , [26] , [28] ). Because of the structure restriction, this will not be true for linear A-codes. In fact, from Theorem 4.1, it is easy to see that , and this bound can be asymptotically achieved. For example, if , then, as we will show in the next section, we have a linear A-code with .
VI. CONSTRUCTIONS
Rank distance codes [9] have been used to construct distributed authentication schemes such as -codes by Johansson [12] and group authentication by van Dijk et al. [8] . Inspired by their work, we show that linear A-codes can be constructed from rank distance codes. It turns out that such constructions result in linear A-codes that asymptotically meet the bound in the previous session.
We first review rank distance codes studied by Gabidulin in [9] . Let be a set of by matrices over . The distance between two matrices and in is defined by and the minimum distance of , denoted by , is defined as Let and . We call an rank distance code. The following theorem establishes the relation between linear A-codes and rank distance codes. As shown in [12] , in an rank distance code, we always have , where . Codes for which the equality holds are called maximum-rank-distance codes (or MRD-codes for short). Johansson [12] showed that MRD-codes can be constructed from linearlized polynomials.
Recall that a polynomial of the form , where is called a linearized polynomial over . Let be integers satisfying . By , we denote the set of all linearized polynomials of degree at most . Assume that are specified elements of the field which are linearly independent over . For each , set . . .
We associate with an matrix , which is obtained by writing (expressed in a fixed base) as a row vector with entries .
Lemma 6.1 [12] : is an MRDcode. That is, is an rank distance code. . The code has the same parameters as the A-code , where , and defined as , . It is easy to verify that is linear and .
Comparing Corollary 6.1 with Bound (1), we get the following result.
Corollary 6.2:
The parameters given in Corollary 6.1 asymptotically meet the bounds in Theorem 5.2.
VII. APPLICATIONS
Linear A-codes have been implicitly used in constructing distributed authentication schemes, for example, A -codes [12] , group authentication schemes [16] , [8] and one-time fail-stop signatures [20] . With appropriate modification, these constructions can be generalized to any linear A-codes. In this section, we show how linear A-codes can be used as a building block for constructing group authentication schemes and broadcast authentication systems.
A. Group Authentication Schemes
Group authentication schemes, also known as threshold authentication schemes, were introduced by Desmedt et al. [7] to generalize conventional A-codes. In a group authentication scheme, there are multiple senders and the generation of authenticator requires collaboration of an authorized subset of senders. In a threshold authentication scheme, there are senders and generation of authenticator for a message requires collaboration of at least senders. A general method of constructing a threshold authentication system is by combining a secret sharing scheme [21] and an A-code, by sharing the authentication key among the senders. It is known that a direct combination will fail to fulfill the security requirement of such systems; and caution must be exercised in regard to the authentication operation for the generation of authenticator such that one cannot recover the underlying authentication key even if he/she has seen the authenticated message from the authorized group. To the best of our knowledge, all the previous constructions use Shamir's secret sharing and some particular examples of linear A-codes [7] , [8] . We show that this construction method is generic in the sense that one can always construct group authentication schemes by combining any linear A-codes and a (linear) secret sharing scheme.
The construction of a group authentication scheme proceeds as follows. Let be an linear A-code over . Assume that there are senders and a receiver . Assume and are distinct elements of ( is associated to ). Let be random values in . The key of is and the key of is (2) Since is an -dimensional vector space over , the right-hand side of (2) is well defined. Assume that senders want to authenticate a message . Each computes and sends to the receiver , where . The receiver computes and accepts as authentic if . The security proof of the above schemes is similar to [8] . Thus, various group A-codes can be obtained through different choices of the underlying linear A-codes. In general, we can always combine a linear A-code and a linear secret sharing scheme to construct a group A-code.
B. Broadcast Authentication Schemes
Broadcast A-codes (also called multireceiver A-codes) [7] are another extension of conventional A-codes. In a broadcast A-code, there are multiple receivers, and a sender can authenticate a message to all receivers by broadcasting a message in such a way that each receiver can individually verify the authenticity of the message. An obvious solution is to use a conventional A-code and give all receivers the same key of the A-code. The sender can just broadcast the authenticated messages of the A-code. This is not secure because a receiver can impersonate the sender and send fraudulent messages to other receiver. Another solution is to choose individual authentication keys for each receiver to share with the sender. To authenticate a message, the sender generates all the authenticators for all the keys, and broadcasts the concatenation of them which each receiver can verify its authenticity through his/her corresponding component. This solution, although secure, is very inefficient when the group of receivers is large as the number of keys and the length of broadcast increase linearly with the number of receivers.
Desmedt et al. [7] gave a solution that achieves both efficiency and security. To guarantee the efficiency, they relaxed the security requirement to the threshold security; namely, it is assumed that the number of the malicious receivers (who might collude to attack the system) is bounded by some threshold parameter. More precisely, in a broadcast A-code, there are receivers in which at most malicious receivers might try to attack the system. A broadcast A-code was constructed in [7] using the linear A-code of Example 6.1. We will generalize this construction method for general linear A-codes.
Let be a linear A-code over . A broadcast A-code using can be constructed as follows. Let denote receivers and let be the sender. The key for the sender is a -tuple , and the key for is where are public, distinct elements of . To authenticate a message , the sender broadcasts the authenticator to all receivers, where , for . Upon receiving the broadcast message, accepts as authentic if Again, using a proof similar to [7] , it is not difficult to prove the security of the above construction. We emphasize that in this construction the key size of the sender and the size of broadcast grows linearly with , the security parameter of the system, rather than , the number of receivers in the previous trivial solution. By choosing efficient underlying linear A-codes, we obtain more efficient broadcast A-codes than previous known schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Linear A-codes are a new, interesting class of A-codes. We have shown that such A-codes can be characterized in terms of families of subspaces of vector spaces over finite fields. We derived an upper bound on the number of source states of these codes and gave constructions that asymptotically meet the bound. However, the construction that is closed to the asymptotic bound is only when , the size field, is sufficiently large. An interesting research problem is whether the bound in Theorem 5.2 can be met for general , and in particular, when is small. A linear A-code is defined using vector spaces over finite fields. Another interesting question is: if we relax the underlying algebraic structure from a finite field to an Abelian group (or modules over a ring), can we improve the bound of Theorem 5.2 or give other nontrivial constructions?
We believe linear A-codes can be used in other distributed systems in which A-codes play a role and so exploring such applications needs further work.
